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While the decarbonisation of the global economy will bring immense benefits in the aggregate 
and to many individuals, it will also be disruptive and costly for some, at least in the short term. 
As these disruptions and costs have become increasingly salient in recent years, there has been an 
explosion of interest in the climate policy community about how low-carbon transitions can be 
implemented justly, equitably, and politically smoothly. A key part of what is needed in 
responding to this growing interest is a better understanding of the suite of ‘transitional 
assistance policies’ and strategies that can be deployed, alongside or as part of climate change 
mitigation policies and processes. Responding to this need, we survey a wide, multi-disciplinary 
literature to answer the ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ of transitional assistance policy: who is likely to 
be adversely affected by the low-carbon transition, and in what ways? What substantive strategies 
and policy instruments are available to governments to mitigate the burdens of low-carbon 
transitions? And how can governments implement such strategies and policies successfully? In 
the course of answering the first two of these questions, we develop a novel typology of 
transitional assistance policies, in which multiple policies are parsimoniously classified according 
to one of four coherent policy strategies, and one of five kinds of beneficiaries. In answering the 
third question, we emphasise the importance of certain ‘state capacities’ for shaping transition 
processes and managing vested interests. 
Key policy insights: 
 Without transitional assistance policies, consumers, workers, businesses, specially-
affected communities, and states that are highly dependent on emissions-intensive assets 
stand to lose from decarbonisation. 
 Transitional assistance policies can be narrow (addressing financial losses only) or broad 
(addressing a wider range of losses), and backward-looking (conservative) or forward-
looking (adaptive). 
 Combining these elements yields four coherent transitional assistance strategies: 
compensation; exemption; structural adjustment assistance; and comprehensive adaptive 
support.  
 Comprehensive adaptive support strategies have greatest potential for just, equitable and 
smooth transition outcomes, but are costlier and more complex to implement. 
 State capacities to steer complex, long-term transitions are therefore a crucial variable in 
transition success.  
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1 Introduction 
The decarbonisation of the world economy is one of the most urgent and difficult challenges facing 
humanity. The substitution of low-carbon for high-carbon technologies and practices will fundamentally 
alter the nature and viability of many economic activities, with some industrial sectors and businesses 
shrinking or disappearing altogether and others emerging and flourishing (Fankhauser 2013; Fankhauser 
and Jotzo 2018; Simpson 2017). Much of this story of transition is profoundly positive, bringing immense 
benefits quite apart from the mitigation of climate change. As the World Bank has put it, “[t]here is no 
reason to think that a zero-carbon economy would be any less prosperous in the long run than a high-
carbon one (if anything, it is likely to be more prosperous)” (Fay et al. 2015, 154). Arguably, in the 
aggregate and over the medium term to long term, the outcome is likely to be net-beneficial even at a 
national scale (GCEC 2014; Green 2015; ILO 2018; OECD 2017; Stern 2015b). But it will also cause 
significant disruption, dislocation, costs and losses to many individuals, groups, and possibly countries, at 
least in the short term. This reality raises complex normative and political questions about which of these 
burdens on which kinds of agents and groups should be mitigated, and how this should be done.  How, 
that is, can low-carbon transitions be made (more) just, equitable and politically ‘smooth’? 
A growing literature on past and current transitions, in the energy sector and in others, offers many 
examples of relative success and failure in the application of ‘transitional assistance policy’ (hereafter 
“TAP”) to mitigate the burdens of transitions that would otherwise be experienced by those adversely 
affected. Yet that literature is extremely heterogeneous in its disciplinary origins, methodologies, scope, 
aims, findings and even the concepts that are used. Recognising the calls from the climate policy and 
sustainability transitions communities for policy relevant-analysis in this area (e.g. Köhler et al. 2019, Stern 
2015a), this article synthesises key findings from this literature insofar as it helps to answer three critical 
questions, around which the article is organised: (i) who is likely to be adversely affected by low-carbon 
transitions, and in what ways? (ii) What strategies and policy instruments are available to governments to 
mitigate the burdens of low-carbon transitions? And (iii) how can governments implement such strategies 
and policies successfully? 
We first survey the literature associated with question (i) to identify and classify the kinds of agents and 
groups at greatest risk of short- and medium-term adverse effects from low-carbon transitions. We identify 
five distinct categories—consumers, workers, specially-affected communities, corporations, and states—
and we justify why these categories of agents/groups should be considered separately when it comes to 
designing TAP. We discuss the ways in which structural change is likely to adversely affect each different 
kind of agent/group, and flag where our later analysis in Parts 3 and 4 is most relevant to each. We also 
emphasise the importance of considering diverse forms of loss—and not merely financial losses—when 
designing TAP and caution against some of the pitfalls of providing assistance to group agents 
(corporations and states). 
We then survey the literature relevant to question (ii) to identify the policies most commonly used and 
recommended for managing transitions. In identifying policies, we draw principally on Schneider and 
Ingram’s (1997) policy design framework, in which policy designs are conceived as institutional structures 
consisting of elements including normative goals/objectives, target groups, tools/instruments, rules, 
rationales, implementing agents and structures, and causal assumptions. We use most of these elements to 
identify four coherent TAP strategies, each occupying a unique position at the intersection of two binary 
dimensions—the TAP’s objective (“conservative” vs. “adaptive”) and its scope (“narrow” vs. “broad”)—
which we argue best capture the main TAP design variables. The four resulting TAP strategies are: 
compensation; exemption; structural adjustment assistance; and what we call “comprehensive adaptive 
support”.  
Combining the four policy strategy categories with our five categories of agents/groups, we generate a 
novel typology of TAP possibilities that enables us to parsimoniously map the logical space of TAP. We 
explain how this can be used in future research and policy analysis on low-carbon transitions.  
Finally, we apply this typology to shed light on question (iii). Specifically, we review case study analyses of 
past transitions and highlight common ‘best practice’ lessons for successfully mitigating the burdens 
associated with low-carbon transitions. We then draw on wider social-scientific research that calls into 
question the generalisability of these lessons, highlighting the important role that state capacities play in 
shaping the potential for governments to implement alternative TAP strategies and manage vested 
interests. We conclude by positing further questions that future research could usefully address. 
The paper’s scope encompasses climate change mitigation-related1 structural change at the international, 
national and subnational level, including structural changes caused by both proximate climate policy 
interventions (e.g. carbon pricing) in the relevant jurisdiction and structural changes not resulting from 
any proximate climate (or other) policy interventions, such as those resulting from changes in the 
availability and costs of clean technologies or in the market structure and business strategies used in 
relevant sectors. Within this scope, the paper’s focus is on the role of government alongside or in 
response to such transitions, and primarily on the (re)distributive aims of government policies. This 
means we only touch on, but do not address in detail, the procedural dimensions of policy that implicate 
normative-political questions of “recognition” and “procedural justice/fairness” (Jenkins et al. 2016), and 
we do not address other pre-transition issues such as the role of impact assessments and effective 
stakeholder engagement and communication strategies (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). Crucial though 
these are to both the normative justifiability and political effectiveness of low-carbon transitions, their 
analysis would require another synthesis article at least.  
We also leave aside here the complex normative and political questions about specifically which agents ought 
to be the beneficiaries of which kind of TAP, if any, and why—and who should bear the costs of the 
redistribution, and why—in any particular case. We simply take it for granted that many governments 
may, for various normative or pragmatic reasons, be motivated to mitigate the adverse short- and 
medium-term effects of low-carbon transitions on various agents and groups, and so we focus most of 
our attention on the policy options and strategies available to them to do so and the means by which to 
implement these successfully. 
In light of the above-mentioned scope of the article, it overlaps considerably, and thus engages where 
relevant, with the rapidly growing body of international law, policy/practice and scholarship pertaining to 
the concept of a ‘just transition’ away from high-carbon sectors for workers and their communities. 
However, our analysis is neither coextensive with, nor limited to, the ‘just transition’, so understood. 
Our analysis also overlaps with literature about good institutional design with respect to social protection, 
labour markets, industrial policy and the business environment in general. Countries that have effective 
institutions in these domains will tend to do better in assisting workers, consumers, firms and 
communities to manage all kinds of change smoothly and equitably, including but not limited to the low-
carbon transition. In general, economy-wide institutions for managing change, such as effective 
employment protection schemes, will be superior means of managing the effects of climate mitigation 
compared with excessive reliance on ad hoc TAPs, such as one-off cash transfers to fossil fuel workers 
(ILO 2018). That said, general schemes may not always be sufficient to address the large-scale, rapid and 
multidimensional transitions entailed in decarbonising an economy. In this article we focus on the basic 
components of transitional assistance measures that can be applied to those adversely affected by low-
carbon transitions; where these can be delivered through a general institutional scheme or an ad hoc 
measure, we remain neutral as to this choice. 
2. Who is likely to be adversely affected by low-carbon transitions, and in what way? 
2.1 Review of literature on affected agents and groups 
The first key variable of TAP is the category of agent/group targeted, i.e. the main ‘losers’ from the 
structural change, absent TAP, and the main potential ‘beneficiaries’ of TAP.  
A number of groups have been identified as potentially at risk. Those most frequently singled out are: 
fossil energy-intensive and trade-exposed states and subnational communities; companies in the fossil fuel 
production sectors and energy utilities reliant on centralised fossil fuel-based electricity generation; 
workers in these industries; and poor and middle income consumers facing higher energy and food prices 
due to fossil fuel subsidy removal and carbon pricing (Helm 2017; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017; 
Spencer et al. 2018). These agents/groups will later be included in our typology of TAP options, so we 
                                                     
1 We therefore leave aside issues associated with climate change adaptation, ‘loss and damage’ and geoengineering. 
here discuss the key effects of low-carbon transitions on each of them (and on related groups, such as 
labour unions and industry associations, where relevant).2  
There is a tendency, in the vast literature relevant to transitions, to focus on only one or two of these 
kinds of agents to the exclusion of the others. For example, much of the ‘just transition’ literature tends 
to focus primarily on workers and, to a lesser extent, on specially-affected communities (e.g. Mertins-
Kirkwood 2018).3 This is entirely understandable, given the concept’s origins in the labour movement and 
the worker-focused text of the just transition paragraph in the preamble to the Paris Agreement. If, 
however, analysis of TAP is to be comprehensive and relevant to climate policymakers, all categories 
must be considered. But this is not to say that that all agents should receive transitional assistance, let 
alone that the TAP applied to all kinds of agents should be the same. Our aim here is purely to identify 
and classify the agents and groups most likely to be adversely affected by climate mitigation-related 
structural change—i.e. the potential beneficiaries of TAP. 
States 
Analysis using energy and integrated assessment models indicates that different economies could face 
very different costs of reducing their emissions in line with a scenario which limits global warming to 2°C, 
with large fossil-fuel exporters (Middle East members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, Russia and Former Soviet States of Central Asia) particularly affected (Blanford, Kriegler, and 
Tavoni 2014). In such a scenario, several regions would hold fossil fuel reserves deemed to be 
“unburnable” (meaning they cannot be exploited in a manner consistent with meeting climate goals). A 
detailed regional analysis shows the Middle East carrying over half of the globally unburnable oil and gas 
and the Former Soviet States a third of the globally unburnable gas (McGlade and Ekins 2015). Where 
fossil fuel assets are state-owned, profit reductions and stranded assets will directly be reflected in state 
balance sheets. Where assets are privately owned, states may experience fiscal pressures from losses in tax 
revenue and increased expenditures on social transfers (e.g. for newly unemployed workers), depending 
on general equilibrium effects and adjustment periods.  Of course, this has considerable implications for 
the interests and incentives of particular governments, parties and officials who benefit privately or politically 
from fossil fuel and other carbon-intensive industrial activity. Accordingly, our discussion of distributions 
within group agents (in Part 2.2, below) and of state-industry relations (in Part 4.2, below) should be 
borne in mind. 
For the purposes of our typology and analysis, we treat the state as a potential beneficiary of TAP only in 
the sense that it is the potential recipient of international assistance from other countries. For that purpose, 
we treat states as unitary agents / “group agents” for simplicity. However, when we discuss other agents 
and groups, we assume a domestic policy focus, in which states are the providers of TAP. We therefore 
assume a degree of state autonomy to provide such assistance; however, as we emphasise in Part 4.2, it is 
important to understand the state in a relational way, as both structuring and interacting with other 
agents/groups (Johnstone and Newell 2018). 
Corporations 
Corporate owners of energy-intensive or emissions-intensive business assets will also be adversely 
affected by low-carbon transitions.4 A number of analyses have estimated the potential for stranded fossil 
                                                     
2 The focus on these agents/groups reflects the dominant focus of the literature on the fossil fuel-intensive 
stationary energy and transport sectors. Additional categories are likely to be needed for analysis of TAP in the land 
(agriculture and forestry) sectors, for example indigenous landholders and farmers. For simplicity, and to reflect the 
current dominant focus on the energy sector, we leave these additional groups out of our typology. However, our 
typology could easily be expanded to include such additional categories of groups/agents, as we think that the 
categories of TAP that we develop in Part 3 could equally be applied to them. 
3 Many other scholars and practitioners, however, apply the term ‘just transition’ to a wider range of agents. 
4 In special cases where suppliers of goods or services to energy-intensive or emissions-intensive companies are 
highly dependent on their energy-intensive or emissions-intensive customers (e.g. due to highly specific assets and 
fuel-intensive assets such as coal-fired power plants under 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios (Bertram et al. 2015; 
Gambhir et al. 2017; Johnson et al. 2015; Spencer et al. 2018). The corporate owners of stranded assets 
will face losses in the form of asset write-downs, lower profits and reduced stock valuations, with further 
potential repercussions for relations with creditors and regulators. Some firms will become 
insolvent/bankrupt if they fail to adequately prepare for and manage these risks in the context of low-
carbon transitions.  
For the purposes of our analysis, we treat corporations as unitary agents (group agents) for the simple 
reason that in most jurisdictions they are separate legal entities. This is often the case also for state-owned 
enterprises, which are especially prevalent in the fossil fuel sector in OPEC countries and China, though 
obviously the state-corporate nexus in such cases is much denser, and this must be taken into account 
when analysing alternative transition strategies as well as appropriate TAPs (see Part 4.2, below). 
Due to the concentration of corporate impacts on particular industries, industry associations will also 
tend to be politically important in the context of the politics of low-carbon transitions, and they will be 
particularly important in countries with industry concertation and corporatist institutions that structure 
interest group interactions with the state (Finnegan 2019; and see below Part 4.2). 
Workers 
It has been estimated that the transition to low-carbon energy production and use under a 2°C scenario 
would lead to the loss of 6 million jobs globally by 2030, while creating 24 million new jobs, compared to 
a “business as usual” pathway (ILO 2018). But this significant net job creation would not be experienced 
by all regions, with the Middle East and Africa experiencing net losses of over 300,000 jobs each, 
assuming their economic structure were to stay in line with historical trends (ILO 2018). A key driver of 
the net economic and employment impact on economies is the degree to which they can adjust to meet 
the challenges of decarbonisation. Job losses will tend to be concentrated in carbon-intensive industries 
and possibly their suppliers (see above) and spatially in the communities where such industries are 
concentrated (see below). 
Because of the importance of paid work to individual livelihoods and household economies, and the 
social-cultural roles work plays in many people’s lives, the employment-related aspects of transitions will 
be among the most important to manage, yet they will often also be the most challenging. Labour unions 
have a crucial role to play in informing, organising, representing and assisting their members in relation to 
the employment and other aspects of low-carbon transitions, and many of them have been instrumental 
in advocating at global and national levels for the creation of decent ‘green’ jobs and for a ‘just transition’ 
of the workforce—including many of the measures highlighted in Parts 3.1 and Part 4.1, below—as 
crucial conditions for decarbonisation (Felli 2014; Rosemberg 2010; Stevis and Felli 2015). Accordingly, 
unions are recognised as a key partner in the social dialogue processes that are enshrined in international 
guidelines on the just transition to low carbon economies (ILO 2015). In practice, unions will tend to be 
more influential over the political course of low-carbon transitions, including securing particular TAPs, in 
countries with union concertation and corporatist institutions that structure interest group interactions 
with the state (Finnegan 2019; and see below Part 4.2). 
Communities 
Industrial closures and associated job losses will often be concentrated in regional communities where 
they generate a significant share of the region’s economic activity, meaning their closure would cause 
knock-on or ‘multiplier’ effects in these specially-affected communities. As is the case globally, the effects 
of decarbonisation within countries will therefore also be unevenly distributed across regions. For 
example, whilst coal mining constitutes just 0.1% of total Indian employment, some Indian states such as 
Jharkhand and Odisha in the East earn 50% of their revenues from coal royalties (Spencer et al. 2018).  
                                                                                                                                                                     
limited alternative markets to sell into) it is conceivable that this category could be expanded to include such 
suppliers. 
Much of the relevant literature urges particular attention to these spatially uneven distributional effects, 
and accordingly we include specially-affected communities within our TAP typology. Of course, 
communities are not group agents, but rather spatially-defined collectives. Accordingly, we suggest that this 
category be understood somewhat more flexibly than group agents such as corporations. Essentially, this 
means that the appropriate direct beneficiary of community-focused TAP could vary from case to case, as 
suggested by relevant examples in Part 3.1, below (e.g. local governments, firms with high growth 
potential in the region, etc.). In particular, the provision of community-level public goods and services—
combining economic infrastructure with social, cultural, civic and environmental public goods and 
services—has the potential to yield genuinely shared community benefits. 
As well as the impacts on communities entangled in fossil fuel economies, low-carbon technologies can 
themselves be the source of adverse community impacts (Galvin 2018; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; 
Yenneti, Day, and Golubchikov 2016). However, in the interests of parsimony we leave them out of our 
classification scheme. 
Consumers 
As well as uneven impacts across economies, industries and workers, the impacts of decarbonisation are 
likely to be felt unevenly by consumers. For example, the higher energy prices that typically result from 
fossil fuel subsidy removal and carbon pricing can disproportionately affect poor consumers (Dorband et 
al. 2019; Hills 2012; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). Decarbonisation policies therefore also risk 
compounding poverty and economic inequality. But this risk can be mitigated—and indeed eliminated—
with conscious effort, careful planning and multi-stakeholder engagement by policymakers (Markkanen 
and Anger-Kraavi 2019). Well-designed and implemented TAP has a crucial role to play in this respect. 
2.2 In what ways are different agents adversely affected by low-carbon transitions? The nature and scope of losses  
When considering who is affected by low-carbon transitions, researchers should attend to the ways in 
which they are adversely affected. This matters because it can inform decision-making about the gravity 
of impacts on agents and can inform policy design choices about the appropriate kind of response 
strategy, policy instrument and scope of assistance. Yet, in economic, policy and even philosophical 
discussions of transitions, there is a tendency to focus on financial losses, such as lost asset value, lost 
profits and lost wages (e.g. Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 2017). Such losses are clearly relevant. But such 
a focus—at least as far as human agents are concerned—is too narrow, for two reasons.  
First, a wide range of other kinds of losses are often experienced by individual persons in the course of 
structural change. Broadly, these can include losses of: external resources of a non-financial nature, such 
as social support networks and the structures through which such networks can be formed, accessed and 
sustained;  attachments a person has to particular people, material things, places and traditions; and 
mental and physical functionings, such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, time-structure, identity, and physical 
health, vigour and energy (see, e.g., Brand 2015 on the various economic and non-economic effects of job 
loss generally; and Strangleman 2001 for a dicsussion of such effects in former coalmining communities). 
Moreover, loss is “given meaning through lived, embodied, and place-based experiences” (Tschakert et al. 
2017, 1). Appreciation of diverse kinds of loss opens up a larger set of possible TAP responses than is 
typically conceived, since non-financial responses may more effectively mitigate non-financial losses than 
financial responses. Such an appreciation also illuminates the fact that for some agents (e.g. wealthy 
consumers) modest financial losses will have no or very limited effect on their valued non-financial 
capabilities and functionings—a fact that is relevant to the normative assessment of their claim to 
transitional assistance. 
Second, focusing on financial losses alone can obscure an important distinction between losses arising at 
the level of a group agent and losses experienced by real human beings as a consequence of group agent-
level losses. Strategic group agents like corporations and (in an international policy context) states may 
incur financial losses, but such losses have no independent moral value—they are mere ‘paper losses’ that 
only have moral significance insofar as they flow through to the wellbeing or interests of real persons. Of 
course, group-level losses do flow through to real persons. But, crucially, the causal chain that links losses 
at the group agent (corporate or state) level with effects on the wellbeing of real persons is mediated by 
choices—by boards and managers, or by governments—about how group agent-level losses are to be 
distributed among the group’s members and stakeholders. Some members and stakeholders, such as 
shareholders of corporations and wealthy citizens of states, will be better placed to absorb and adapt to 
those losses (and will often have greater causal and moral responsibility for failing to mitigate the group-
level losses in the first place) than others, such as lower-level workers and poorer citizens. Targeting 
transitional assistance at group agents leaves these important secondary distributional decisions to group-
level governing bodies. 
3. What policy strategies are available to governments? 
3.1 Review of the literature on TAP instruments 
From the literature on TAP, it is clear that governments often have a wide range of instruments at their 
disposal to mitigate substantive transition losses. These instruments are summarised below.  
First, governments can provide grants or other kinds of cash payments, or issue loans, to any kind of 
agent. These can be unconditional or (more or less) conditional on the money being spent on a certain 
class of eligible goods/services/projects or on the agent taking particular actions.  
Conditionality is often an indicator that the objective of the payment is to facilitate the agent’s adaptation 
to new (e.g. low-carbon) circumstances. For example, governments sometimes provide ‘structural 
adjustment assistance’5 payments to workers made unemployed by structural change, as has often 
occurred in relation to trade liberalisation (see Porto 2012) and industrial restructuring (Beer 2015). These 
can include subsidies for relocation costs, employment search costs or training costs, or earnings subsidies 
that supplement wages earned from re-employment (which incentivises re-employment and facilitates 
adjustment to lower-wage jobs) (Porto 2012). Structural adjustment assistance can also be provided to 
firms, as a subsidy to help them retool or otherwise restructure their operations so as to remain viable 
under new policy or market pressures (Beer 2015; Spencer et al. 2018) or for technology research, 
development and demonstration. Conditional financial assistance can also be provided to consumers (to 
help them upgrade energy-intensive household assets like fuel-intensive vehicles and poorly insulated 
housing stock, as has occurred in many jurisdictions) (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). Conditional 
funds can also be supplied internationally to other states, for example to help them diversify their 
economies away from fossil fuel production (Barnett and Dessai 2002).6 This has occurred to some extent 
at the EU level, through the provision of EU funds for structural transitions in coal-dependent regions, 
and there have been calls to expand such assistance in future EU budget cycles (e.g. Pilsner et al. 2018). 
There are also growing calls for state and multilateral development finance institutions and private 
financial institutions to strategically prioritise and allocate funds for just transitions (Reitzenstein and 
Popp 2019; Robins, Brunsting and Wood 2018a, 2018b). 
By contrast, unconditional payments may indicate that the payment is intended as ‘compensation’, in the 
sense of mitigating or fully offsetting financial losses incurred by the agent. In the context of climate and 
energy reforms, such payments are commonly made to consumers (uniformly or in a targeted way) and 
adversely-affected firms to offset tax or price increases (Klenert et al. 2018; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 
2017). They can also be made to subnational jurisdictions to offset lost tax revenue (Caldecott, Sartor, and 
Spencer 2017). Unconditional transfers could in principle also be made by one country or group of 
countries to another country as compensation for the cross-border ‘impact of response measures’—
something the OPEC group has long sought within the UN climate change regime, but which other 
countries have long resisted (Barnett and Dessai 2002).7 
Unconditional payments can also take the form of categorical social welfare payments. These can be part 
of a general unemployment protection scheme (where these exist) or made uniquely available in a 
particular sector or region undergoing structural change, as with special retirement, redundancy or 
unemployment benefits that are additional to existing contractual or legislative entitlements (Caldecott, 
                                                     
5 “Adjustment” arguably does not quite adequately capture the transformative impulse behind this forward-looking 
approach to assistance, but it is the English word conventionally used in policy circles. 
6 However, in light of our comments in Part 2.2, international donors motivated to support a just transition in other 
countries should consider forms of assistance that are more directly targeted at the individuals and groups who will 
be adversely affected in those other countries. 
7 See footnote 6, above. 
Sartor, and Spencer 2017; ILO 2018).8 Sometimes governments also pay out a firm’s legal liabilities to 
their employees (e.g. redundancy or retirement benefits, healthcare costs) or cover their site remediation 
costs arising under planning and environmental laws. Such payments are effectively subsidies to the 
recipient firms since government is stepping in to cover firms’ existing legal liabilities (Caldecott, Sartor, 
and Spencer 2017). The Coal Transitions Project identified that special unconditional payments to 
workers were common in past coal transitions across the studied jurisdictions, while unconditional 
payments to companies were more common in the more state-planned/coordinated European economies 
of Poland, the Czech Republic and Spain (Spencer et al. 2018).9  
Second, governments can provide public goods and services ‘in-kind’. Some such services can be 
provided to workers, for example education and training, psychological counselling, employment 
placement, careers counselling, advice on establishing a small business, and transportation/relocation 
services (Beer 2015; ILO 2018; Wiseman, Campbell, and Green 2017). For businesses in affected regions, 
business consulting and technical assistance are sometimes recommended as an alternative to cash 
assistance (Haney and Shkaratan 2003). Sometimes consumers are directly provided with goods in-kind, 
such as free smart meters or energy-efficient products (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). The direct 
provision of home insulation has been recommended as a means to tackle the economic effect of carbon 
pricing on fuel-poor households (Hills 2012).  
More typically, in-kind public goods and services are provided at the community level in specially-affected 
communities, with the intention of stimulating aggregate demand in that area or providing other 
community-scale social, cultural, civic or environmental/amenity benefits (Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 
2017; Sartor 2018). These often include infrastructure such as public transport facilities, renewable energy 
generation facilities, electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, social housing projects, 
environmental restoration or beautification projects, educational institutions, sports stadia, recreational 
facilities, and so on (Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 2017; Klenert et al. 2018). They sometimes include 
facilities whose purpose is to memorialise a region’s industrial past, such as museums and monuments 
(Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 2017; Harfst 2015). Community-level in-kind services provided by 
governments can include local government capacity-building, regional economic diversification planning, 
research and development projects, innovation strategy development, and consultancy services such as 
tourism, marketing and investment facilitation assistance (Beer 2015; Haney and Shkaratan 2003). Public 
employment programmes can link community-scale public works with employment and wider social 
objectives, and there is increasing interest in developing such programmes to achieve joint 
decarbonisation and social objectives (A. Hess 2019; ILO 2018). At the international level, there is also 
increasing interest in and provision of technical assistance, capacity-building services, and knowledge-
sharing focused on TAP via regional and multilateral platforms. Examples include the activities of the 
Forum on Response Measures (and its subsequent derivations) under the UN climate change regime,10 
the European Commission’s Platform on Coal Regions in Transition,11 and the Just Transition Taskforce 
of the Powering Past Coal Alliance.12  
Third, sui generis policy programmes or schemes of a more policy-intensive kind can be established to 
provide special kinds of assistance to manage the restructuring or decline of an industry in an orderly and 
efficient way. Historical examples include Japan’s use of fiscal policy and planned capacity reductions to 
manage the decline of its textile and ship-building industries in the 1960s and 70s (Vogt-Schilb and 
Hallegatte 2017), the establishment in the 1980s of the job-creation agency British Coal Enterprise in the 
former British coalfields (Beatty, Fothergill, and Powell 2007), and the structural adjustment programmes 
applied to various primary industries in Australia in the 2000s (Beer 2015). More recent examples from 
                                                     
8 Firms themselves typically have legal obligations to pay redundancy, retirement or other benefits to workers, which 
may be contractually or legislatively required. We are focusing here on government transition policies that are 
additional to such pre-existing entitlements. In countries that have generous, pre-existing social welfare schemes and 
worker protections, the case for such additional transitional payments will be correlatively weaker.  
9 In some of these cases, the firms themselves were state-owned enterprises, so such transfers essentially involved 
one arm of the state giving to another. 
10 See https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/response-measures#eq-2.  
11 See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/coal-regions-in-transition/working-groups-
meetings.  
12 Both authors are academic partner members of the Taskforce. 
the climate context include the multi-stakeholder German Coal Commission, which in early 2019 agreed a 
plan to phase out coal power by 2038 (Egenter and Wehrmann 2019) and Chile’s multi-stakeholder 
process for phasing out coal-fired power generation.13 These kinds of programmes often facilitate a more 
systematic approach to firm and workforce transitions, for example through intra-industry ‘worker 
transfer schemes’ or on-the-job retraining schemes (Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 2017; Wiseman, 
Campbell, and Green 2017). In this vein, long-term decarbonisation strategies (e.g. as called for in Article 
4.19 of the Paris Agreement) can also be an important source of, or platform for, TAP. Such strategies 
can help governments and other stakeholders to anticipate the costs of the transition, and TAPs can be 
incorporated into their design and implementation. 
Fourth, where a structural change is proximately caused by a new policy or law in the relevant 
jurisdiction—in our case, a climate change mitigation policy/law—an additional suite of TAP options 
becomes available through the provision of various kinds of exemptions or cross-subsidies in the new law 
or policy itself. These could include blanket or partial exemptions for particular industries, sectors, or 
activities from compliance with the law or policy, and they could apply to incumbents only (known as 
‘grandfathering’), or to new entrants, too. They could also be time-limited in various ways, including 
through delays in the policy’s application, graduated implementation, or temporary relief from liability 
(e.g. ‘tax holidays’) (Trebilcock 2014).14 Where the new law or policy raises new revenue—as with carbon 
pricing, for example—some of this revenue can be ‘recycled’ to finance expenditures on the other kinds 
of transition policies discussed in this section. Klenert et al. (2018) review the way revenues were recycled 
in a number of carbon pricing schemes. 
Fifth, governments may accompany policy reforms with wider changes in fiscal policy, such as changes to 
other taxes and transfer schemes, as part of policy ‘packages’ (Ahmad and Stern 2009). These bring the 
potential for numerous economic co-benefits while also facilitating wider political support for carbon 
pricing (Klenert et al. 2018; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). Tax breaks can also be used as a means to 
attract inward investment into declining regions (Beer 2015). 
Finally, while the abovementioned kinds of assistance implicate the state’s (re)distributive functions, the 
state via its representatives is also capable of engaging in expressive acts that may well be important facets 
of a comprehensive response to structural change. This may include, for example, the state’s public 
acknowledgement or recognition of a region, industry, firm or group of workers’ contribution to society 
(and see above regarding museums and memorials).  
3.2 Classification of TAP instruments 
Drawing on the above literature review of TAP instruments and on Schneider and Ingram’s (1997) policy 
design framework, we classify such instruments into four categories based on two binary variables that in 
our view capture their most important features.  
The first variable is the policy’s objective. We distinguish between TAPs whose objective is conservative, in 
the sense that the policy aims to stabilise the agent’s or group’s interests over time by restoring the 
agent/group, partially or fully, to the condition they were in before the structural change occurred (or 
would have been in but for the structural change), and TAP that is adaptive, in the sense of facilitating the 
agent’s or group’s adjustment to the new circumstances. Conservative policy is more backward-looking 
and static, whereas adaptive policy is more forward-looking and dynamic.15  
The second variable is the scope of the losses that the policy aims to remedy. As discussed in Part 2.2, 
theory and practice concerning TAP in large part focus on addressing only financial losses, though it is 
possible and, in some cases, desirable also to address certain non-financial losses. Accordingly, our scope 
variable distinguishes between transition policies aimed at addressing ‘narrow’ losses (financial only) and 
‘broad’ losses (financial plus other kinds of value).  
                                                     
13 See http://www.energia.gob.cl/pagina-mesas/405.  
14 With respect to climate change, since liability-imposing climate policies typically apply only to business 
corporations and other large energy- or carbon-intensive incorporated entities (such as hospitals and universities), 
this class of TAP is usually available only to such entities. That said, the benefiting firms may pass the cost savings 
onto customers and the ultimate consumer, depending on the firms’ competitive environment. 
15 Though the process of adaptation may itself involve some backward-looking cognitive work, such as appropriately 
memorialising the past (Thompson 1998). 
Combining the ‘objective’ and ‘scope’ variables yields four ideal-type (and, for the moment, agent-neutral) 
TAP strategies: 
1. Compensation (conservative; narrow): includes unconditional financial payments that are 
intended to mitigate financial losses incurred by the agent, as well as accompanying fiscal policy 
changes (tax, subsidy and transfer schemes) that serve such a purpose. Since non-instrumentally-
valued goods are in principle non-compensable, compensation assistance is assumed to be 
narrow in scope (but see Goodin 1989 on “ends-displacing compensation”).  
2. Exemption (conservative; broad):16 includes legal exemptions from relevant primary laws, 
including climate change mitigation laws. Since the objective of such exemptions is to de facto 
maintain the pre-reform legal position (i.e. in all relevant respects, not merely financial) of a 
relevant class of agents, the objective is conservative and the scope is broad.  
3. Structural adjustment assistance (adaptive; narrow): this category involves conditional monetary 
payments and in-kind assistance to individuals, the objective of which is to facilitate agents’ 
adaptation or transformation to the new economic conditions that exist as a result of the 
structural change, but whose scope is narrow (e.g. conditional cash payments or in-kind 
retraining or relocation support to workers).  
4. Comprehensive Adaptive Support (CAS) (adaptive; broad): this category includes the adaptive 
financial measures associated with structural adjustment assistance but goes beyond these to 
include adaptive measures of a non-financial nature (see Part 2.2). Specifically, it includes in-kind 
adjustment assistance, conditional cash payments, public employment schemes and community-
level public investment in economic infrastructure, as well as public investment in non-economic 
infrastructure, expressive responses, and sui generis government policy programmes whose 
objective is to assist relevant agents adapt comprehensively (not merely financially) to the new 
circumstances brought about by a structural change. 
For completeness, it should be acknowledged that not offering any transitional assistance is itself a policy 
choice and therefore could be considered as a fifth category of TAP.17 
3.3 TAP options: a typology 
Combining the four ideal-type TAP strategies just discussed with our five agent/group categories from 
Part 2.1, we generate a novel typology of TAP possibilities that enables us to parsimoniously map the 
logical space of TAP (Table 1). Of course, a TAP package may encompass more than one combination of 
agent types and policy strategy types.  
Though necessarily somewhat simplified, it is envisaged that this typology will prove useful in at least two 
ways to policymakers, researchers and other stakeholders working in the field of climate change 
governance. First, it communicates in a clear and simple way the basic TAP options, mapped according to 
the most important design elements or variables: objective, scope, and target agents/groups. Policymakers 
and others, such as labour unions, specially-affected communities, and activists campaigning for a ‘just 
transition’ can use the typology to think through the key questions and issues associated with TAP.  
Second, by focusing on theoretically meaningful distinctions among TAP options, we hope to have 
provided researchers with a useful scheme for classifying variation in TAPs. Policy-relevant research on 
mitigating the adverse socioeconomic effects of low-carbon transitions has grown rapidly over the last 
few years, but our review finds that, so far, this research is quite fragmented, dominated by single-case 
case studies that vary considerably in their concepts and measures. Our theoretically-informed typology 
facilitates ongoing efforts to build a more unified and mature research programme on low-carbon 
transitions. 
 
                                                     
16 In our classificatory scheme, this class of TAP is only available in the case of structural changes induced by a 
proximate legal/policy change. While governments could of course pass new laws that protect incumbents against 
changes in technology or market conditions, we consider this to be outside the scope of TAP. 
17 As noted in Part 1, some persons may be entitled to general social protection policies available to a wider class of 
persons, such as unemployment benefits.  
Table 1: Typology of substantive TAP options18 
Notes: policy “ideal types” (column headings) are described in Part 3.2 (which draws on Part 3.1). Agent/group types (row headings) 
are discussed in Part 2.2.  
4. How can governments successfully implement TAP? 
The growing literature on TAP is imbued with an understandable sense of urgency to discover ‘what 
works’. In the present article, we cannot hope to provide a comprehensive answer to this complex and 
contingent question. Our more modest aims are two-fold. In Part 4.1, we aim to provide a brief synthesis 
of the ‘best practice’ lessons emanating from the existing literature. However, since much of this literature 
consists of single-case case studies, there are pitfalls in generalising these ‘lessons’ to other cases. 
Accordingly, in Part 4.2, we draw on a wider body of social science research to emphasise the importance 
and cross-national variability of state capacities to implement alternative TAP strategies and to manage 
vested interests. 
When analysing ‘what works’, one should always ask: works for whom and to what end? We have been 
deliberately ecumenical about the normative justifications of various particular TAP possibilities, 
recognising that governments will have varied and often multiple reasons for pursuing TAP, including 
ensuring equity/fairness, justice and/or simply a socio-politically smooth low-carbon transition. The case 
study literature on transitions that we analyse here often takes an implicit stand on what success looks 
like, which can roughly be defined as one or both of (i) the needs and interests of workers, consumers 
and communities that are already vulnerable and likely to be adversely affected by low-carbon structural 
change are identified, recognised and taken into account, and these groups are adequately assisted in a 
                                                     
18 This typology was created by Green for use in the Coal Transitions project: https://coaltransitions.org/. Earlier 
versions of the typology were published in Green (2018) and Spencer et al. (2018, 340). 
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distributive sense; and (ii) the transition was widely politically accepted and sustained, without significant 
political backlash or policy retrenchment. Accordingly, we adopt this rough working definition of success 
in the below analysis. Our analysis below focuses on the substantive/distributive aspects of successful 
TAP. However, we first make two brief points about two sets of issues that are largely excluded from our 
analysis, but that need mentioning. 
First, as this definition of success makes clear, the manner and extent to which affected groups are 
recognised and included in processes and procedures (e.g. information-provision, consultation, dialogue, policy 
design) relating to low-carbon transitions is, as and of itself, an important determinant of a just and 
equitable low-carbon transition (Healy and Barry 2017; Jenkins et al. 2016; Kumar, Americo and 
Billingham 2016; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019). It is also likely to have a material influence on the 
political acceptability and sustainability of transition policy, since low-carbon policies and transition 
strategies that are determined through processes perceived to be inclusive and fair are more likely to be 
publicly accepted and politically sustained (Maestre-Andrés, Drews, and van den Bergh 2019; Miller, 
Richter, and O’Leary 2015). At a minimum, transition processes should include “social dialogue”, or 
tripartism between the state and affected businesses and labour unions (ILO 2015). But participation 
should not necessarily be limited to these groups. Efforts to include vulnerable consumers and other 
groups typically underrepresented in policy processes—including women and (where applicable), informal 
workers, indigenous communities and ethnic minorities—are also normatively desirable in their own right 
and conducive to politically successful policy outcomes (Brugnach, Craps, and Dewulf 2017; Buckingham 
and Le Masson 2017; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). For some 
transitions and in some regions—e.g. pertaining to the land sector, and especially in poorer regions—
unions and potentially even corporate firms may not be relevant stakeholders, in which case the 
imperative to include other affected stakeholders is even stronger.  
Second, our rough definition of success focuses on the social benefits produced by TAP without 
reference to its costs and the distribution of those costs. The literature on coal transitions suggests that the 
costs of TAP programmes are rarely systematically analysed ex ante or evaluated ex post (Caldecott, Sartor, 
and Spencer 2017). In the wider literature, we are aware of only a few attempts to analyse the costs of 
actual TAP programmes (Beatty, Fothergill, and Powell 2007; Frondel, Kambeck, and Schmidt 2007; 
Gray 1995, 2001; Hallegatte, Fay, and Vogt-Schilb 2013; Magee 2001). We return to the question of costs 
in Part 5.  
4.1 Lessons from transition case studies 
There is now a considerable, and expanding, literature on recent-historical energy-industrial transition 
cases in which adverse impacts on specific groups and agents were mitigated. Some cases have been seen 
as relatively successful (see generally Altenburg and Assmann 2017; Caldecott, Sartor, and Spencer 2017; 
Hallegatte, Fay, and Vogt-Schilb 2013; Klenert et al. 2018; OECD 2017; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017), 
including: the West German Ruhr region’s transformation from a coal- and steel-based economy in the 
1960s to a knowledge-based service economy during the 1990s and early 2000s (Galgóczi 2014; Herpich, 
Brauers, and Oei 2018); a major steelworks closure in New South Wales, Australia, in the late 1990s 
(Evans and Phelan 2016); and the coal phase-out of Ontario, Canada, completed in 2014 (Harris, Beck, 
and Gerasimchuk 2015). Other lessons have been inferred from case studies that have been identified as 
less successful, more mixed, or still embryonic, including: the decline of the British coalfields (Beatty and 
Fothergill 1996; Beatty, Fothergill, and Powell 2007); the post-unification decline of the East German coal 
industry (Herpich, Brauers, and Oei 2018); and the current challenges facing upper Silesia in Poland 
(Bukowski, Śniegocki and Wetmańska 2018). Beyond the energy sector, lessons from case studies of TAP 
in trade liberalisation and other structural adjustments are discussed by Trebilcock (2014).  
Synthesising from these transition case studies, the ‘best practice’ lessons offered are:  
 Pre-transition: implement long-term economy-wide or sectoral decarbonisation planning, to enable 
early implementation of policies for a managed decline of industries, and articulation of a long-term 
vision to support the growth of new industries; and ensure transparent communications, consultation 
and co-design processes, including collaboration between governments, businesses, labour unions, 
consumer groups and other affected stakeholders, to ensure inclusion, input and buy-in from the 
most affected groups;  
 In the short-term, put in place social protections and wider support for vulnerable workers and 
consumers. For vulnerable workers, this includes redundancy benefits, unemployment benefits, early 
retirement benefits, pension ‘bridging’, and healthcare benefits to mitigate workers’ economic losses, 
and non-financial support such as psychological and careers counselling. For vulnerable consumers, 
this includes in-kind social support, conditional or unconditional cash payments, offsetting reductions 
in applicable taxes or offsetting increases in transfer payments; 
 Over the medium-term, boost government and business investment in economic, social, cultural, 
environmental and civic public goods and services in affected regions to facilitate new linkages (e.g. 
via transport and telecommunications infrastructure), revitalise public spaces, attract and support 
alternative industries and new residents; and provide skills development and retraining for affected 
workers to facilitate labour market adjustment and more comprehensive adaptation, with an emphasis 
on on-the-job retraining; 
 Over the longer-term, invest in education and innovation, to support long-term regional and national 
growth and prosperity.  
(see Gambhir, Green, and Pearson 2018, 7–13 for elaboration). 
4.2 The limits of ‘lessons’: the importance of state capacities and institutions 
Best practice recommendations from the case study literature are targeted at vulnerable workers, 
consumers and communities, consistent with our earlier discussion of the pitfalls of providing financial 
assistance to group agents. Moreover, the recommendations are clustered around adaptive policies, 
especially CAS (with the exception of short-term measures, which are concentrated on measures from our 
‘compensation’ category). Given the multi-dimensional nature of these kinds of transitions, we are not 
surprised that CAS policies, if designed and implemented well, have the greatest potential to produce just, 
equitable and smooth transition outcomes. But this is a big ‘if’. CAS strategies are also the most complex 
kinds of TAP to design and implement, and they are more likely to succeed in states that have particular 
state capacities, including the ability to overcome or manage vested interests.  
By way of illustration, we focus on CAS policies to facilitate regional development in specially-affected 
communities—arguably the most complex category of TAP to implement successfully. Scholars of 
‘regional innovation systems’ have identified various barriers—organisational, institutional, and network-
related—to economic diversification in old industrial regions, and have emphasised the complex mix of 
state capacities required to overcome them (Coenen, Moodysson, and Martin 2015; Grabher 1993; 
Tödtling and Trippl 2005). Governments typically require not merely the financial resources and 
hierarchical authority to ‘push’ new technologies into such regions, but also the capacity to steer long-
term, participatory, cooperative processes that empower diverse local actors to recombine their existing 
knowledge, skills and competences in new ways. These may include the capacity to experiment with new 
governance processes, to broker dialogue among the various actors (especially firms), to build or 
reconfigure networks, to disseminate information, and to facilitate shifts in cultural norms and 
worldviews (Campbell and Coenen 2017; Loorbach 2010; Rotmans, Kemp, and van Asselt 2001; Stroud 
et al. 2014).  
The importance of these capacities is underscored by attending to the role of vested interests in low-carbon 
transitions, especially where these are closely integrated with the state in one way or another. In regions 
and countries overly-reliant on a particular carbon/energy-intensive industry or industries, the patterns of 
mutual dependence among industry stakeholders and governments can create a political ‘lock-in’ effect 
that is difficult to overcome (Baeten, Swyngedouw, and Albrechts 1999; Baker, Newell, and Phillips 2014; 
Grabher 1993; D. J. Hess 2014; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Swilling, Musango, and Wakeford 2015). 
Variations in state capacities, and in the interests and power of interest groups, can significantly affect not 
only whether a particular ‘best practice’ recommendation is feasible, but also whether it is desirable, since 
the potential for TAP to be co-opted by vested interests may militate against CAS-type policies that are 
more complex and resource-intensive. To understand the suitability of alternative transitional assistance 
policies and strategies, it is therefore necessary to draw on political science theories to illuminate various 
phenomena, including the power, objectives, strategies and tactics of vested interests and the way they 
organise to influence politics and the policy process (Downie 2017, 2019; Kern and Rogge 2018; 
Meadowcroft 2009, 2011) as well as the strategies and tactics of relevant political parties, and party 
competition/cooperation dynamics (Aklin and Urpelainen 2013). It is also necessary to incorporate 
theories of the state into such analysis and, more specifically, theories of state capacities and institutions, 
dominant state discourses and paradigms, and the historical, spatial and material forces affecting states 
(Hall 1993; Hughes and Urpelainen 2015; Johnstone and Newell 2018; Kern 2011; Meckling and Nahm 
2018). In this respect we echo Johnstone and Newell’s call to understand the state in a “dynamic, 
relational and practice-oriented manner” (2018, 80) when analysing TAP possibilities and prospects. 
One useful set of analytical tools for understanding the dynamics, relational configurations and practices 
of states is provided by comparative politics and comparative political economy. These disciplines are 
increasingly being applied to the analysis of state capacities to steer low-carbon transitions in general 
(Ćetković and Buzogány 2016; Finnegan 2019; Kuzemko et al. 2016; Kern and Markard 2016) and offer 
insights that can be applied to transitional assistance strategies and policies in particular (Wiseman, 
Campbell and Green 2017). Scholarship on “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2001) and 
“patterns of democracy” (Lijphart 2012) suggests that the state capacities for long-term governance 
processes like industrial transitions are likely to vary systematically across jurisdictions according to their 
political and economic institutions. For instance, “coordinated market economies”, like Germany and 
Denmark, have corporatist structures of interest-group representation, which consolidate interest groups 
into peak bodies and systematically incorporate them into policymaking processes in a way that promotes 
intra-sectoral compromises among employers (via industry associations), workers (via unions) and the 
state (Hall and Soskice 2001; Lijphart 2012, chap. 9). These countries possess the kind of steering and 
consensus-building capacities necessary to manage comprehensive and sustained regional and industrial 
transitions such as decarbonisation, giving them an intrinsic advantage (Finnegan 2019; Stroud et al. 
2014). By contrast, the institutions of “liberal market economies”, like the UK, the US and Australia, 
characteristically foster competitive-market modes of interaction among plural interest groups, respond to 
short-term incentives, adopt a more laissez faire approach to innovation, training and industrial 
development, and tend to be more sensitive to consumer interests (Hall and Soskice 2001; Lijphart 2012). 
In these countries, policymakers and stakeholders motivated to steer just, equitable and smooth low-
carbon transitions will need to think more creatively about the TAP strategies likely to be most effective. 
For example, they may need to be more opportunistic in the exploitation of the state’s policy levers, 
entrenching transition processes when policy windows open by creating new institutions and using fiscal 
measures to consolidate political support (Finnegan 2019; Lockwood 2013). Meanwhile, they may also 
need to work through civil society to build surprising alliances and to utilise private governance channels, 
such as shareholder activism (Wiseman, Campbell, and Green 2017).  
Overall, the above observations counsel attentiveness to the contingencies of particular transition 
contexts, suggesting that there are likely to be limits to the generalisability of universal ‘best practice’ 
recommendations. But the need for more contingent and tailored recommendations does not leave 
motivated policymakers and stakeholders bereft of guidance from experiences in other places and times. 
As we hope to have illustrated here, various factors tend systematically to affect state-economy-society 
interactions and state capacities to steer low-carbon transitions. The point to underscore is that 
policymakers and stakeholders should draw lessons that are relatively transferable to their institutional and 
other relevant circumstances.  
5.  Conclusion: future research directions  
We conclude by suggesting areas for future research that could usefully address knowledge gaps we 
identified during our review, organised around our three section themes. 
The negative effects of low-carbon transitions  
The literature provides a fairly consistent body of evidence as to which kinds of agents and groups are 
likely to be adversely affected by low-carbon transitions. However, there remains considerable scope to 
identify at a more fine-grained, sub-national level which firms, workers and communities are most likely 
to be affected by specific low-carbon transitions.  
In addition, we see merit in future research on exactly how these agents and groups are affected, and how 
such effects ought to bear on the prioritisation of TAP. In particular, the issue of non-financial losses 
deserves further consideration, especially with regard to how TAP can help mitigate agents’ loss of the 
wellbeing that stems from their attachment to people, places and skills, and from their status and standing 
in their communities.  
TAP strategies and policy instruments 
In Part 3 of our paper we proposed a typology of TAPs, noting that part of our motivation was to 
provide a system for classifying variation among them. The greatest gap we see in this regard is a need for 
an empirical database of past/current TAPs. We see merit in collaborations between researchers to 
compile such a database with appropriate haste.  
TAP implementation and success 
Understanding more systematically the drivers of and barriers to successful implementation of different 
TAP strategies remains the greatest area of future research need. Substantively, we see particular value in 
studies that focus on the state capacities necessary to steer just, equitable and smooth low-carbon 
transitions, and on the role of economic interest groups, both capital and labour, in shaping or resisting 
such transitions. We also urge greater attention to the role of political and political-economic institutions 
in shaping TAP design and implementation. Such research holds the potential to generate a more 
systematically variegated set of ‘best practice’ recommendations that are specific to clusters of jurisdictions 
that share similar institutions and other circumstances. In this regard, we see a particularly great need for 
research on liberal market economies where non-market coordinating institutions are weaker, since these 
weaknesses limit the extent to which tripartite social dialogue and cross-party negotiation can be relied 
upon to achieve just, equitable and smooth low-carbon transitions. 
For this purpose, we see particular value in studies that use a comparative research design—be they 
qualitative or quantitative. As TAP data on a sufficiently large number of countries become more widely 
available, studies using statistical methods would be of value. Having said that, detailed case studies will 
continue to be crucial to understanding the complex dynamics of transitions and the effects of TAP. In 
this regard, we note with concern an under-representation of developing country case studies in the 
current literature, with the possible exception of South Africa. We identify a particular need for greater 
attention to low-carbon TAP in China, India, Brazil, and other high-emitting industrialising countries.  
We also see great potential value in scholarship in a more constructivist vein that considers cultural-
sociological variables to shed light on the causes and effects of TAP success. On the one hand, we would 
expect entrenched, dominant cultural norms and values to shape the possibilities for and success of TAP, 
as they shape the possibilities for climate action more generally (Eckersley 2017). Yet we would also 
expect new ideas about TAP to influence the course of such transitions, at least in some contexts—
moments of crisis and transition are, after all, occasions when ideas are most influential (Blyth 2002). 
Furthermore, we see an important opportunity to incorporate TAP into emerging research themes within 
the “sustainability transitions” literature identified in a recent review by Köhler et al. (2019). The most 
relevant themes include: the destabilization, decline, and phase-out of existing systems and regimes; the 
speed of transitions and how can they be accelerated; the politics of winners and losers from sustainability 
transitions and the resistance of incumbent/vested interests; forward-looking and policy-applied 
transitions research; traditional policy instruments, and policy mixes, in sustainability transitions; just 
transition commissions or authorities (and similar organisational innovations) as ‘intermediating agencies’ 
and ‘governance experiments’; the role of civil society organisations in promoting just transitions, and the 
just transition ‘movement’ from the perspective of social movement theory; the role of finance capital in 
sustainability transitions; consumers and everyday sustainabilities (i.e. how forward-looking/adaptive TAP 
can facilitate these); place-based and spatially-sensitive aspects of transitions; the transformation of urban 
infrastructure; and the ethical aspects of transitions (Köhler et al. 2019). 
Finally, as flagged at the beginning of Part 4, there is a greater need for research on the costs of alternative 
TAPs and, more importantly, their cost-effectiveness with respect to key common aims of TAP. The 
research community would also benefit from quantitative and qualitative assessments (ex ante and ex post) 
of the wider impacts of TAP so as to better capture both the financial and non-financial impacts of 
transitions and TAP, as an aid to multi-criteria analysis in policy decision-making. Likewise, there is a 
need for more rigorous normative analysis of TAP that goes beyond an efficiency framework—and even 
beyond a utilitarian framework—to incorporate justice-related concerns, including the effects of 
transitions and TAP on people’s core capabilities, basic needs, basic rights and legally protected human 
rights. 
In sum, we see manifold fruitful directions for future research on strategies and policies to enable just, 
equitable and politically smooth low-carbon transitions. We could imagine few topics more urgent and 
important for the social sciences today. 
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